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Comments
AMERICANS AND THE MOON TREATY
NANCY L. GRIFFIN
O N JULY 20, 1969, the United States successfully completed
a technological space maneuver to place man on the moon
for the first time.' Man's physical presence on the lunar surface
represented such significant progress that the existing international
law governing activities in outer space was no longer adequate to
deal with the consequent legal questions.' The United States had
taken a major step toward making the future occupation and ex-
ploitation of the moon a reality. This event created a particular
1 TIME, July 25, 1969, at 10.
SIn 1969, the international law governing states' activities in outer space
consisted of United Nations General Assembly resolutions and two treaties:
the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S.
206, and the Rescue and Return Agreement of 1969, 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.IA.S.
6599. See Matte, Legal Principles Relating to the Moon, in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE
LAw 253, 253-55 (N. Jasintuliyana & R. Lee ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as
Matte].
ISee 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 23, 24-25, U.N. Doe. A/8720 (1972)
(Statement by the Chairman of the Legal Subcommittee at the 110th meeting
on September 5, 1972).
4 See M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & I. VLAsIc, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN
SPACE 760 (1963) [hereinafter cited as McDOUGAL], citing A. CLARKE, THE
CHALLENGE OF SPACESHIP 36 (1959). Clarke more recently observed that "the
moon may turn out to be such a valuable and interesting place that it may
one day be colonized on a really large scale." McDOUGAL, supra, at 760 n.46.
Doctors speculate that heart patients could significantly prolong their lives as
inhabitants of the moon because of low gravity conditions. McDOUGAL, supra, at
760 n.46. Soviet commentators anticipate the formation of a lunar city which
would start manufacturing spacecraft by the twenty-first century. McDOUGAL,
supra, at 760 n.46, citing M. VASSILIEV & S. GUSHCHEV, REPORTS FROM THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 207 n.34 (1962).
5See Office of Technology Assessment, Study of the United Nations Moon
Treaty (1980) (unpublished study), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., AGREEMENT GOVERNING
THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES ON THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES 276-94
(Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as OTA Study]. The OTA Study contains
portions of a number of reports. Among those cited for their treatment of lunar
resource exploitation are Schwenk and Sadin, Technological Opportunities for
Lunar Resources Utilization: A NASA Study Program (1980) (report to be pub-
lished); Driggers, Is Lunar Material Use Practical in a Non-SPS Scenario?
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need for the further development of extraterrestrial property law.!
Responding to the deficiency in international space law, the
United Nations began work on an agreement that would specific-
(May 14-17, 1979) (a paper presented at the Fourth Princeton/AIAA Conference
on Space Manufacturing Facilities); Lunar and Planetary Institute, Extraterrestial
Materials Processing and Construction, NSR 09-051-001 Mod. No. 24 (1980).
See also OTA Study, supra at 283 for a table of useful products from lunar
sources. One example of a potentially marketable resource is "Moon Iron"
which is not subject to corrosion on Earth and could be used for industrial pur-
poses. The production of this iron is expected to be highly profitable. Vassilevskaya,
Notions of "Exploration" and "Use" of Natural Resources of Celestial Bodies,
PROC. 20TH COLLOQUIUM ON OUTER SPACE L. 473 (1977). Many commentators
foresee technological success in producing rocket fuel from lunar materials, im-
proving the economics of space flight "by a factor of ten or more." A. CLARICE,
THE EXPLORATION OF SPACE 116 (rev. ed. 1960). See generally J. HOLMES,
AMERICA ON THE MOON (1962).
The OTA was established by the Technology Assessment Act of 1972, 2
U.S.C. §§ 471-481 (1976). The function of the office is set forth in § 472(c):
The basic function of the Office shall be to provide early indi-
cations of the probable beneficial and adverse impacts of the
applications of technology and to develop other coordinate infor-
mation which may assist the Congress. In carrying out such func-
tion, the Office shall:
(1) identify existing or probable impacts of technology or tech-
nological programs;
(2) where possible, ascertain cause-and-effect relationships;
(3) identify alternative technological methods of implementing
specific programs;
(4) identify alternative programs for achieving requisite goals;
(5) make estimates and comparisons of the impacts of alterna-
tive methods and programs;
(6) present findings of completed analyses to the appropriate
legislative authorities;
(7) identify areas where additional research or data collection is
required to provide adequate support for the assessments and esti-
mates described in paragraph (1) through (5) of this subsection;
and
(8) undertake such additional associated activities as the appro-
priate authorities specified under subsection (d) may direct.
Senator Howard W. Cannon, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, and Senator Adlai E. Stevenson, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space, jointly wrote to Congressman
Morris K. Udall, Chairman of the Technology Assessment Board and requested
that the OTA undertake a small scale assessment of the impact the Moon
Treaty would have on the capability of the United States to exploit extraterrestrial
materials. OTA Study, supra, at 265. In conducting this study, the OTA staff held
interviews with selected specialists, examined contributed articles, papers, and
correspondence, and reviewed the available literature. Id. at 275.
6 Bhatt, Legal Controls of the Moon and Celestial Bodies, 8 INDIAN J. INT'L
L. 33, 34-35 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Bhatt]. Bhatt lists issues concerning
lunar property rights which are left unanswered by the existing international
law dealing with outer space. Id.
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ally address the legal problems arising from man's newly acquired
capacity to land on the moon. After seven years of deliberations,'
the United Nations produced the Agreement Governing the Activi-
ties of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies' (Moon
Treaty). To date only five countries have signed the treaty."0
The United States was an active participant in the formulation
of the Moon Treaty." It has not signed the agreement, however,
because it has met with strong opposition from a variety of
sources.'" The United States government has decided to postpone
a final decision regarding ratification of the treaty until it has had
time to thoroughly evaluate its principles. 3
This comment will discuss the legal implications of the Moon
Treaty. Analysis will focus on both the agreement's provisions and
the treaty's effect on prospective space activities by the United
States. The alternatives to ratification available to the United States
will also be reviewed.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Although man has always been curious about the realm of
outer space, particularly the moon," the possibility of physical
"See Matte, supra note 2, at 255.
O N.Y. Times, July 4, 1979, at A4, col. 1.
9 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, opened for signature December 18, 1979, 18 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1434; 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 33, U.N. Doc. A/34/20
(1979) [hereinafter cited as the Moon Treaty]. In 1978, the Legal Subcommittee
of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space decided
to refer to the instrument as an "agreement" instead of a treaty. Matte, supra
note 2, at 253.
10 Galloway, Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies: History and Analysis (1980), reprinted in SENATE COMM.
ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., AGREE-
MENT GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES ON THE MOON AND OTHER CELES-
TIAL BODIES 1 & 44 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as Galloway]. The
five nations which have signed the treaty are: Chile on January 3, 1980; France
on January 20, 1980; Romania on April 17, 1980; Philippines on April 23, 1980;
and Austria on May 21, 1980. Id.
"1 See International Space Activities, 1979: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Space Science and Applications of the House Comm. on Science and Tech-
nology, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 82 (1979) (Statement of S. Neil Hosenball) [here-
inafter cited as 1979 Hearings].
12 OTA Study, supra note 5, at 319.
13 Id. at 346.
'See generally G. ABErI, THE HISTORY OF ASTRONOMY (1952).
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exploration was not a reality until the late 1950s when the United
States and the Soviet Union each launched an unmanned satellite
into outer space." Encouraged by this initial breakthrough, and
despite the high costs of exploration," both the United States
and the Soviet Union became committed to developing their space
capabilities as matters of national policy."
In response to the high priority the major powers had placed
on space exploration, the United Nations decided to give the same
priority to the development of appropriate legal controls.'8 In 1958
the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution
calling for a study of "the nature of legal problems which may
arise in the carrying out of programmes to explore outer space..'' .
One year later the United Nations General Assembly established
the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (hereinafter
'
5 S. BHAn7, LEGAL CONTROLS OF OUTER SPACE iX (1973) [hereinafter cited
as S. BHATr]. The U.S.S.R., launched its unmanned Satellite Sputnik-I into outer
space in 1957, which was followed by the United States unmanned Satellite Ex-
plorer I in 1958. Id.
'"When space exploration first began there was considerable debate whether
such exploration was of sufficient significance to the community of mankind to
justify the high cost involved. The "Killian" Report to the President of the
United States in 1958 suggested that "it does not seem as though the moon and
other planets offer possibilities for settlements or that they will have significant
value as military bases or as the source of raw materials." Bhatt, supra note 6,
at 83, citing Schachter, Recent Technological Developments: Political and Legal
Implications, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 246 (1958).
When NASA first began looking ahead to Project Apollo it estimated that it
would cost a total of $20 billion. McDOUGAL, supra note 4, at 756 n.27.
17 Bhatt, supra note 6, at 34. Urging the importance of remaining at the fore-
front of space technology, President Kennedy said, "We cannot possibly permit
any country whose intentions toward us may be hostile to dominate space." J.
HOLMES, AMERICA ON THE MOON: THE ENTERPRISE OF THE SIXTIES 20 (1962).
President Johnson stated later, "We cannot be second in space and first in the
world." S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, THE LAW RELATING TO AcTIvITIES OF MAN
IN SPACE 10 n.3 (1963). For a discussion on the motivating factors of power
and prestige, see V. VAN DYKE, PRIDE AND POWER: THE RATIONALE OF THE
SPACE PROGRAM 119 (1964).
1' Bhatt, supra note 6, at 34. The U.N. had previously given lunar explora-
tion and the associated legal problems a lower priority ranking. See 24 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 21) 28, U.N. Doc. A/7621 (1969).
"G.A. Res. 1348, 13 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 5-6, U.N. Doc. A/4090
(1958). This responsibility was delegated to the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space created by the same resolution. For a discussion of
the Ad Hoc Committee, see Jessup & Taubenfeld, The Ad Hoc Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 877 (1959).
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referred to as COPUOS) as a standing committee of the United
Nations."
The early work of COPUOS, though often interrupted due to
the tensions of the cold war,21 eventually led to the adoption of the
Outer Space Treaty of 1967." The Outer Space Treaty was the
first major international agreement governing the use of outer
space and codified the general legal principles the United Na-
tions had previously adopted via resolution in order to govern
activities in outer space." The drafters realized at the time of its
20 G.A. Res. 1472, 14 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 5, U.N. Doc. A/4354
(1959). The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space originally con-
sisted of twenty-four countries. After the Committee became a permanent
body its membership was increased to twenty-eight countries in 1962, thirty-
seven in 1974, and forty-seven in 1977. As the group grew larger, it became
more difficult for its members to reach a consensus on the different issues. The
Committee decided, however, that decision making by consensus was superior to
any other method for their purposes. Galloway, Consensus Decisionmaking by
the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 7 J. SPACE
L. 3 (1979).
21 Hosenball, The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space: Past Accomplishments and Future Challenges, 7 J. SPACE L. 95, 97 (1979);
1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at 83 (statement of S. Neil Hosenball).
22 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2. The Outer Space Treaty was signed by
over 60 nations, including Canada, Japan, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom,
and the United States. See generally Adams, The Outer Space Treaty: An Inter-
pretation in Light of the No Sovereignty Provision, 9 HARv. INT'L L.J. 140
(1968); Dembling & Arons, The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty, 33 J. AIR
L. & CoM. 419 (1967).
'See Dembling & Arons, supra note 22, at 428. The authors summarize the
Outer Space Treaty's general principles as follows:
[T]he Treaty reflects a broad international consensus that outer
space and celestial bodies are to be free for exploration and use
for the benefit of all mankind; that the principles of international
law are applicable thereto; that celestial bodies are to be devoted
exclusively to peaceful purposes, and weapons of mass destruction
are to be banned from outer space; that assistance is to be rendered
to astronauts; that States are to be held internationally responsible
for their activities in outer space, and held liable for damages
caused thereby; that ownership of objects is not changed by their
presence in outer space and on celestial bodies; that harmful con-
tamination of the environment of earth, outer space, and celestial
bodies shall be avoided; that information gathered from activities in
outer space and on celestial bodies is to be broadly disseminated;
and that stations, installations, etc., on celestial bodies are to be
open for inspection.
Id. at 456.
2 4 See G.A. Res. 2222, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 13, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966); G.A. Res. 1721A, 16 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 7, U.N. Doc. A/5100
(1962).
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creation that the broad precepts of the Outer Space Treaty would
require further elaboration as progress in space science and tech-
nology created a need for more specific regulation."
Since space science and technology were progressing at such a
rapid pace, the members of COPUOS had the requisite incentive
to develop the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty. Within the
first nine years after the Outer Space Treaty took effect, the Com-
mittee successfully expanded portions of the treaty in three supple-
mental agreements: the Rescue and Return Agreement of 1968,"'
the Liability Convention of 1973,"' and the Registration Conven-
tion of 1976.8
The decision to formulate an agreement governing man's activi-
ties on the moon was the result of proposals submitted by Argen-
tina and the Soviet Union. In 1970 Argentina submitted to the
Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS" a draft agreement concerning
the use of the moon's natural resources.' In May 1971 the Soviet
Union requested that the General Assembly include an item en-
titled "Preparation of an International Treaty concerning the
moon" in its agenda for the twenty-sixth session."' The Soviet
Union then submitted its own draft treaty that dealt with naviga-
tional matters relating to lunar exploration.' In response to the
draft of the Soviet Union, the General Assembly adopted Resolu-
tion 2779' which formally requested that COPUOS and its Legal
I See I. WHITE, DECISIONMAKING FOR OUTER SPACE 182 (1970), where the
author has tabulated the legal problems associated with the Outer Space Treaty;
Dembling & Arons, supra note 22, at 428, 456.
11 Rescue & Return Agreement, supra note 2.
27 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Ob-
jects, effective October 9, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762.
218 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, effective
September 15, 1976, T.I.A.S. No. 8480.
- COPUOS consists of two subcommittees, a Legal Subcommittee and a
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee. The Legal Subcommittee holds a four-
week session in the spring of each year and at the conclusion of that session
prepares a report to the parent Committee. Hosenball, supra note 21, at 96.
024 U.N. GAOR, Annex (Agenda Item 28) 6-7, U.N. Doe. A/AC 105/101
(1970).
1 26 U.N. GAOR, Annex (Agenda Items 33 & 92) 1, U.N. Doc. A/8391
(1971). See Matte, supra note 4, at 255.
-2 26 U.N. GAOR, Annex (Agenda Items 33 & 92) 10, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.
568.
1 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 29) 28, U.N. Doe. A/8429 (1971).
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Subcommittee consider as a matter of high priority the develop-
ment of a draft treaty and report on this draft the following year.'
At its 1972 session, the members of the Legal Subcommittee
formulated a draft treaty consisting of a preamble and twenty-one
articles.' The Subcommittee was unable to reach a final consensus
on the treaty, however, due to conflict over the scope of the treaty,
provisions regulating information exchange and natural resource
exploitation.' Most of the delay was caused by the refusal of the
Soviet Union to accept a provision in Article 11" which stated that




During the seventeenth session of the Legal Subcommittee the
Austrian delegation made a special effort to resolve the outstanding
issues by conducting a series of informal consultations' and formu-
lating a new draft of the agreement on the basis of those discus-
sions."0 The Austrian text was reviewed by the Legal Subcom-
mittee the following year,' approved by COPUOS with a few
minor changes, ' and submitted to the General Assembly of the
United Nations for adoption." On December 5, 1979, the Moon
Treaty was formally adopted by a unanimous vote of the General
Assembly" and it was opened for signature and ratification on
December 18."
34 Id. See Matte, supra note 2, at 255.
127 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 19 & 25, U.N. Doe. A/8720 (1972). The
draft was formulated by the members of the Working Group that the Legal
Subcommittee had appointed to handle the project. Id. Working papers were
variously submitted by Australia, Bulgaria, Egypt, France, India, Italy, Sweden,
the United Kingdom, and the United States with suggested provisions. 27 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 221, U.N. Doc. A/8701 (1972).
627 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 3-4, U.N. Doe. A/8720 (1972).
17 N.Y. Times, July 4, 1979, at A4, col. 1.
38 Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 11, para. 1.
8 See 33 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 11, U.N. Doc. A/33/20 (1978).
40 33 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 26, U.N. Doc. A/33/20 (1978).
41 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 10-12, U.N. Doe. A/34/20 (1979).
42Id.
4Id.
4N.Y. Times, July 4, 1979, at A4, col. 1.
"Galloway, supra note 10, at 44.
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II. GENERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY'S PROVISIONS
The stated purposes of the Moon Treaty are 1) "to promote on
the basis of equality" the further cooperation among States in ex-
ploring the moon and other celestial bodies, 2) to prevent the moon
from becoming an area of international conflict, and 3) to define
and develop the provisions of existing legal instruments in relation
to the moon and other celestial bodies.' The Moon Treaty is most
specifically concerned with the benefits to be obtained from the
exploitation of the moon's natural resources."' The more general
benefits to be obtained from the exploration and use of the moon
are the subject of the Outer Space Treaty."
The scope of the Moon Treaty is set forth in Article 1. The
question of whether or to what degree the instrument should
apply to other celestial bodies besides the moon was the first of
the treaty's three major issues." The members of COPUOS finally
agreed that Article 1 should read, "The provisions of this Agree-
ment relating to the moon shall also apply to other celestial bodies
... except in so far as specific legal norms enter into force with
respect to any of these celestial bodies."' Article 1 also extends
the scope of the treaty to include circumlunar space," a provision
that the Outer Space Treaty did not contain." The agreement ex-
pressly provides that it does not apply to extraterrestrial materials
that reach-the earth by natural means."
' Moon Treaty, supra note 9, preamble.
4 7 Galloway, supra note 10, at 46.
4B Id.
4'27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 3, U.N. Doc. A/8720 (1972). Some
states within the Committee, particularly the Soviet Union and the German
Democratic Republic, thought that the treaty should remain as originally drafted
and pertain exclusively to the moon. The United States, Argentina, Belgium,
Chile, Mexico, and Sweden were among the countries desiring a broader scope
for the treaty. See id. at 25; Hosenball, supra note 21, at 99; Matte, supra note
2, at 257; Kopal, Legal Questions Relating to the Draft Treaty Concerning the
Moon, PROC. 16TH COLLOQUIUM ON OUTER SPACE L. 180, 181 (1973).
"Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 1, para. 1.
"1 Circumlunar space is space surrounding the moon. SPACE AGE DICTIONARY
161 (rev. 2d ed. 1963).
"Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2, para. 2. This provision was originally
proposed in the Soviet draft, 26 U.N. GAOR, Annex (Agenda Items 33 & 92)
11, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.568 (1971).
" Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 1, para. 3. A meteorite, for example,
would not be subject to the provisions of this agreement.
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Like Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, Article 2 of the
Moon Treaty requires that all activities on the moon be carried
out in accordance with international law and, in particular, the
Charter of the United Nations." Many commentators regard this
provision as a potential loophole for avoiding the prohibitions
against military activities in outer space.5 These commentators
base their opinion on the fact that Article 51 of the Charter'
essentially affirms the right of States to self-defense,"7 but does not
define the nature of self-defense. 8 It is quite possible that a party
to the treaty could interpret this provision in the Charter as an
exception to the general prohibitions against military activity."'
Article 3 of the Moon Treaty, however, helps to relieve this pos-
sible confusion. In addition to reiterating the prohibitions in
Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty against the establishment
of military facilities, the testing of weapons, the conduct of mili-
tary maneuvers, and the orbiting or placement of nuclear or other
weapons of mass destruction in outer space,' Article 3 explicitly
prohibits "the threat or use of force or any other hostile act on
the moon."'"
54 Compare Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2, with Outer Space Treaty,
supra note 2, art. III.
5 Matte, supra note 2, at 259; 0. OGUNBANWO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
OUTER SPACE 32 (1975).
'0 Article 51 of the U.N. Charter states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right
of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsi-
bility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at
any time such action as it deems necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
U.N. Charter art. 51.
I71d. See note 55 supra, and authorities cited therein.
For a discussion on whether a party is to await "an armed attack" before
using self-defense or whether self-defense can be used anticipatorily, see S. BHATT,
supra note 15, at 191-95 (1973).
59 One commentator speculated that Articles 2 and 3 of the Moon Treaty,
when read together, could lead to confusion because they contain contradictory
terms. Matte, supra note 4, at 259.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. IV.
s' Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3, paras. 2-4.
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Many commentators regard Article 3 as an improvement on the
Outer Space Treaty for other reasons. First, it makes the prohibi-
tions of the Outer Space Treaty against certain military activities"2
apply with equal force to the use of the moon." Secondly, the Moon
Treaty forbids states-parties" from using the moon for hostile acts
or threats against the earth, the moon, or spacecraft and person-
nel." Thirdly, Article 3 expressly prohibits the orbiting of nuclear
and other weapons of mass destruction around the moon and
within other trajectories to or around the moon." In so providing,
Article 3 responds to the criticism of Article IV of the Outer
Space Treaty,"" which, strictly interpreted, seems to permit the use
of a fractional orbit bombardment system ." Article 3 does not
2 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. IV, paras. 1 & 2. "States Parties
. . . undertake not to . . . install such weapons on celestial bodies .... ." Id.
para. 1. "The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications,
the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on
celestial bodies shall be forbidden." Id. para. 2.
3 Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3, paras. 2-4. Because the exploration of
space is so closely associated with a nation's military function, it is often difficult
to separate the peaceful from the military uses of the moon. S. BHATT, supra
note 15, at 196-97. The international community felt that it had been successful
in making this distinction in the Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794,
T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 which prohibits claims of sovereignty and
non-peaceful activity in Antarctica, and used this treaty as a pattern for certain
provisions of the Outer Space Treaty. See generally Staub, The Antarctica Treaty
as Precedent to the Outer Space Treaty, PROC. 17TH COLLOQUIUM ON OUTER
SPACE L. 282-87 (1973); Taubenfeld, Seas, Poles and Outer Space, 190 THE
NATION 293-97 (1960). The moon, however, was not specifically included in
several of the Outer Space Treaty's prohibitions against certain military activi-
ties. One of the stock phrases within the Outer Space Treaty is "including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies." Spokesmen for the Soviet Union stated in de-
liberations over the Outer Space Treaty that it could not accept the United States
proposal and that it would be better to speak in terms of "the moon and other
celestial bodies" throughout the treaty for the sake of consistency. Fawcett,
Politics of the Moon, 25 WORLD TODAY 357, 361 (1969). The delegate from
Ceylon expressed concern that this omission would lead other parties to the
agreement to interpret the Outer Space Treaty as allowing by implication these
otherwise forbidden activities on the moon. S. BHAT, supra note 15, at 201.
""States Parties" is the Moon Treaty's term for those nations which become
parties to the agreement. Moon Treaty, supra note 9. The term "state-parties,"
"states" and "parties" will be used interchangeably throughout this article.
63 Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3, para. 2.
66 Id. at para. 3. A trajectory is the path of any missile or projectile. SPACE
AGE DICTIONARY 210 (rev. 2d ed. 1963).
67 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. IV.
68 Galloway, supra note 10, at 49. A fractional bombardment system is a
bomb-carrying spacecraft that does not complete a full orbit of the earth or
the moon. SPACE AGE DICTIONARY 25 (rev. 2d ed. 1963). Article 1 has the
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address the issue of whether conventional weapons are also pro-
hibited but implicitly forbids their useY
Article 4 of the Moon Treaty re-emphasizes the principle that
the exploration and use of the moon shall be carried out for the
benefit of all nations."0 It adds to Article I of the Outer Space
Treaty by providing that due regard should be paid to the interests
of present and future generations in terms of promoting higher
economic and social standards."1 The provision also can be inter-
preted to encourage the potential involvement of states that are
not parties to the agreement 2 as it provides that "[i]nternational
cooperation in pursuance of this Agreement should be as wide
as possible ... .""
Article 5 commits states-parties to make thorough and timely
reports on their scientific investigations." While the Outer Space
Treaty also requires its parties to share such data,' critics have
complained that the United States and Soviet Union have been
slow to do so in the past." Under the new treaty parties have a
duty to inform the United Nations Secretary General, as well as the
public, of the time, purposes, location, duration, orbital parameters
and results of each mission to the moon." Some commentators have
noted that, unlike the Outer Space Treaty," the Moon Treaty does
not require the Secretary General to dissiminate this information.
Although the members of COPUOS agreed on the type of in-
formation to be provided, the timing of the parties' dissemination
of the information was the second of the three major issues that
same effect as Article 3 in including circumlunar space within the scope of the
treaty. S. BHATT, supra note 15, at 200; Matte, supra note 2, at 258.
"See Matte, supra note 2, at 259.
"Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 4, para. 1.
71 d. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. I.
72 Galloway, supra note 10, at 50. The report points out that the possible
inclusion of states that are not parties to the agreement is a significant point to
keep in mind because membership varies for each space treaty.
" Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art 4, para. 2.
74 Id. art. 5, para. I.
75 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. XI.
78 N.Y. Times, July 4, 1979, at A4, col. 1.
'7 Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art 5, para. 1.
71 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. XI.
7'Galloway, supra note 10, at 51.
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arose in negotiating the treaty."' The United States proposed that
parties intending to conduct activities on the moon be required to
supply the required information no later than sixty days before
launching." The Soviet Union, on the other hand, did not want
to commit itself to furnishing information that could be obsolete
on the day of launching.8' COPUOS members finally agreed that
the initial information "shall be given as soon as possible after
launching" and that information on the results "shall be furnished
upon completion." ' It was decided that any party who conducts
a mission lasting more than thirty days must report periodically
at thirty-day intervals." The treaty, however, implicitly limits this
obligation to provide information to a six month period,8 since
after this length of time parties need report "only significant addi-
tions" to the information already given.
Article 7 requires that states-parties inform the Secretary Gen-
eral of the measures they have taken to protect the lunar and terres-
trial environments.87 Similarly, should any state or one of its citi-
zens place radioactive materials on the moon, it is to notify the
Secretary General in advance of the presence and purpose of such
placement. The article also calls for the public identification of
areas of the moon having special scientific interest so that they may
be set aside as international scientific preserves." The treaty gives
no particular procedure for setting aside a given area, but stipulates
that the "arrangements are to be agreed upon in consultation with
the competent bodies of the United Nations.""
" Kopal, Legal Questions Relating to the Draft Treaty Concerning the Moon,
PROC. 16TH COLLOQUIUM ON OUTER SPACE L. 180, 181 (1973).
81 See Matte, supra note 2, at 260. In proposing advance notification the
United States was hoping to encourage cooperative research in accordance with
art. 4 of the Moon Treaty and to avoid unintentional interference with the
activities of other states-parties in accordance with art. 8. Id. See note 99 infra,
and accompanying text.
8' See Matte, supra note 2, at 260.




87 Id. art. 7, para. 2.
88 Id.
81 Id. para. 3.
00Id.
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The Moon Treaty also provides in Articles 8, 9 and 12 for speci-
fic freedoms that are available to parties in conducting their activi-
ties on the moon. States may place their personnel, space vehicles,
equipment, and other facilities anywhere on or below the surface
of the moon.9' Article 9 encourages parties to establish manned
and unmanned stations on the moon as long as the owners inform
the Secretary General of the location and purpose of the station
and do not use a larger area than they need for a given activity.'
Under Article 12 each state retains full jurisdiction and control
over the stations and other facilities it places on the moon.' Fur-
thermore, Article 8 permits launching from the moon," an activity
that was not considered at the time the Outer Space Treaty was
drafted.'
In addition to granting certain freedoms, the Moon Treaty im-
poses certain responsibilities on its parties. These responsibilities
are discussed in Articles 8 through 13 and involve 1) the preser-
vation of life, 2) the return of property to its rightful owner, and
3) the concurrent use of the moon by two or more parties. First,
Article 10 requires that parties to the treaty adopt all practicable
measures to safeguard the life and health of all persons on the
moon, including the offering of shelter to persons in distress."
When a party places its facilities on the moon it is with the under-
standing that other parties may use those facilities in the case of
an emergency.97 Secondly, Articles 12 and 13 direct states-parties
to return any property found outside of its intended location and
to notify the Secretary General or the launching party of space
objects that have crashed on the lunar surface.98 Finally, under
Articles 8 and 9 states,-parties are not to interfere with the activi-
91 Id. art. 8, para. 2.
92 Id. art. 9, para. 1.
Id. art. 12, para. 1.
MId. art. 8, para. 2.
95 See Fawcett, supra note 64, at 359. One advantage to launching from the
moon to other planets is that the moon's gravitational pull is one-sixth of the
Earth's, which would make launchings easier and more economical. Id.
Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 10, paras. 1 & 2.
97Id. art. 12, para. 3. Conversely, parties finding it necessary to use another
party's facilities must promptly notify the owner or Secretary General of such
use. Id.
98 Id. arts. 12 & 13; see Rescue and Return Agreement, supra note 2, art. 5.
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ties of another state or impede free access to the moon."9
Article 11 addresses the issues of national appropriation, prop-
erty and ownership rights, and the exploitation of natural resources.
Unlike the Outer Space Treaty where the moon and other planets
are discussed in their entirety, the Moon Treaty distinguishes the
lunar surface and subsurface from the natural resources of the
moon.' Like Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, Article 11 of
the Moon Treaty provides that the moon is not subject to national
appropriation by any means.' ' The Moon Treaty explicitly states
that "[n]either the surface nor the subsurface ...or natural re-
sources in place" shall become the property of any state, organiza-
tion, or natural person."' This provision not only extends the non-
appropriation principle to non-national entities," but also implies
that the non-appropriation principle is to be more strictly applied
to the surface and subsurface of the moon than to the natural re-
sources.'" Natural resources are subject to this restriction only
insofar as they remain "in place.
''9
Even with respect to the surface and subsurface of the moon,
the non-appropriation principle is somewhat illusory.'" During the
negotiations of the Moon Treaty the French delegate to COPUOS
" Moon Treaty, supra note 9, arts. 8 & 9.
100 Id. art. 11.
"I Id. para. 1. Compare Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 11, para. 2 with
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. II. The Moon Treaty adds the word
"any" in front of "claim" to say that "the moon is not subject to national
appropriation by any claim of sovereignty." This language implicitly overrules
the traditional modes of acquisition. For an excellent discussion of the non-
appropriation principle, see Bhatt, supra note 6, at 38.
'o' Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 11, para. 3.
'"After the Outer Space Treaty was ratified, critics became concerned that
the specific prohibition against "national" appropriation would by implication
permit "non-national" appropriation. Matte, supra note 2, at 264. This provision
directly responds to that concern.
2 (x See American Bar Association International Law Section, Report to the
House of Delegates 5 (unpublished report with recommendation submitted to
the House of Delegates at its 1980 meeting) [hereinafter cited as ABA Int'l L.
Section Report].
'0 Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 11, para. 3. The two words "in place"
were proposed by the United States in 1973 and "are intended to indicate that
the prohibition against [the] assertion of property rights would not apply to
natural resources once reduced to possession through exploitation." Hosenball,
supra note 21, at 103.
'
03Gorove, Property Rights in Outer Space: Focus on the Proposed Moon
Treaty, 2 J. SPACE L. 29 (1974).
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explained that the Outer Space Treaty had created an anomaly,
for "the same resolution that forbade the appropriation of celestial
bodies encouraged their use...... He went on to say that "the Sub-
committee would have to decide how far the principle of non-
appropriation was compatible with effective exploration and ex-
ploitation. 1. 8 This anomaly remains unresolved in the Moon
Treaty. Compounding this problem is the fact that the Moon
Treaty encourages the establishment of stations and other facili-
ties"' but imposes no limitation on time or duration. The treaty
very clearly states that "the placement of ... stations and installa-
tions on or below the surface of the moon, including structures
connected with its surface or subsurface, shall not create a right of
ownership over the surface or subsurface of the moon.' 10 Yet the
owner of established lunar facilities, with few exceptions,"' is able
to exercise dominion and control, to the exclusion of others, for
an indefinite period of time over a well defined area of the moon,"'
the rights that are characteristic of and inherent in the concept
of property."'
The provisions surrounding the lunar natural resources created
the greatest controversy among the Committee members through-
out the entire negotiating period. At first the members of the legal
subcommittee could not agree whether provisions relating to nat-
ural resources should be included in the treaty."' The Soviet Union
took the position that since the exploitation of lunar resources
would not be practical or economically feasible for many decades,
the inclusion of provisions concerning their use would be prema-
107 Bhatt, supra note 6, at 42.
108 Id.
109 Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 9.
"
01d. art. 11, para. 3.
" These "exceptions" include the responsibility of states-parties to admit
authorized visitors and persons in distress. Id. art. 15, para. 1; art. 12, para. 3.
"
2 See id. arts. 8 & 9.
"'Gorove, supra note 106, at 30. See generally CSABAFI, THE CONCEPT OF
STATE JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW (1971). Dr. Csabafi has sug-
gested a concept of jurisdiction which he calls "functional" jurisdiction, not unlike
the functional sovereignty Dr. Bhatt discusses. Bhatt, supra note 6, at 40. Both
involve the right to control.
1'427 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 18-19, U.N. Doc. A/8720 (1972); see
Galloway, supra note 10, at 31-33.
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ture."' The use of lunar resources, in the Soviet opinion, should
be the topic of a separate treaty at a later time. "' Taking a differ-
ent approach, the United States favored the inclusion of such pro-
visions"' under the theory that it is better to develop international
controls before there are any major conflicts and while the value
of the resources is still uncertain."'
The most important provision"' with respect to the lunar nat-
ural resources, and indeed the central concept of Article 11, is
that "the moon and its resources are the common heritage of man-
kind.''. The "common heritage" concept has no clear juridical
meaning.. and is not defined by the treaty. It is to be regarded in
terms of the entire agreement"' and especially paragraph 5, which
provides for the establishment of an international regime to govern
the exploitation of the lunar natural resources as soon as such
exploitation becomes feasible.'
"527 U.N. G.A.O.R., Supp. (No. 20) 18-19, U.N. Doc. A/8720 (1972);
Matte, supra note 2, at 266.
I" Galloway, supra note 10, at 31-33.
"' Matte, supra note 2, at 266.
'Id.; see Taubenfeld, supra note 63, at 297.
1 See notes 166-80 infra, and accompanying text.
1"0 Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 11, para. 1.
121 Finch, 1979 United Nations Moon Treaty Encourages Lunar Mining and
Space Development, PROC. 22D COLLOQUIUM ON OUTER SPACE L. 123 (1979);
Rosenfield, Article XI of the Draft Moon Agreement, id. at 210. See also
Cocca, Mankind as the New Legal Subject: A New Juridical Dimension Recog-
nized by the United Nations, PROC. 13TH COLLOQUIUM ON OUrER SPACE L. 211
(1971). At first the "common heritage" concept seems to be a mere variation of
the phrase "province of mankind," which was used in Article I of the Outer Space
Treaty and Article 4 of the Moon Treaty. It becomes apparent upon closer
examination, however, that the two concepts can be distinguished. First, the two
concepts involve two different groups of people. The exploration and use of the
moon is the "province of all mankind," but the moon and its natural resources
are the "common heritage of mankind." Rosenfield, supra at 211. One com-
mentator suggested that the absence of the word "all" in the phrase "common
heritage of mankind" implies that "mankind" is limited, "at least in reference
to the exploitation of natural resources of the moon, to that portion of man-
kind that is party to this agreement." Id. But see Galloway, supra note 10, at
58. Second, the concepts apply to different functions. The phrase "province of
mankind" covers the entire range of activities associated with the moon, while
the "common heritage" concept is so closely connected with the establishment
of an international regime to regulate resource exploitation that it seems to
apply exclusively to the moon's natural resources. Id. The Moon Treaty's critics
are very concerned about the legal implications of the "common heritage" phrase.
See notes 167-80 infra, and accompanying text.
122 Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 11, para. 1.
23 Id. para. 5.
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The establishment of an international regime is the Moon
Treaty's method of regulating resource exploitation." Parties to
the agreement are committed to "undertake to establish an inter-
national regime, including appropriate procedures," as soon as
"such exploitation is about to become feasible.""' There has been
some question whether "regime" refers to a system of rules and
regulations or to a new international organization."' Because the
treaty stipulates that the creation of the regime is to include "appro-
priate procedures, 1 . the latter is generally accepted as the better
interpretation.' 8 The meaning of the phrase "undertake to estab-
lish" has also been questioned.2' It is not clear whether the treaty
would obligate its parties to conclude negotiations on a second
treaty or whether it would simply impose a duty to negotiate in
good faith." In addition, the treaty does not give any factors for
determining at what point the exploitation of resources is "about
to become feasible.''. The treaty merely provides that states-parties
are to inform the Secretary General and the international commu-
nity "to the greatest extent feasible and practicable" of any natural
resources they may discover on the moon."
The purposes of the regime are listed in paragraph 7 of Article
11. " These purposes are the orderly and safe development of the
moon's natural resources, their rational management, the expansion
of opportunities for their use, and an equitable sharing by all states-
parties in the benefits derived from those resources." "Equitable
sharing""' within the context of the Moon Treaty does not mean
sharing on an equal basis since special consideration is to be
given to "the interests and needs of the developing countries, as
1 Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 11, paras. 1, 5, & 7; see 1979 Hearings,
supra note 11, at 104 (statement of Leigh S. Ratiner on behalf of the L-5
Society).
" Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 11, para. 5.
2 OTA Study, supra note 5, at 335.
12" Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 11, para. 5.
"'OTA Study, supra note 5, at 325.
"Id.
130 Id.
"' See Moon Treaty, supra note 9, at art. 11.
1"2 Id. para. 6.
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well as the efforts of those countries which have contributed di-
rectly or indirectly to the exploration of the moon.'" The treaty
does not define "direct" and "indirect" contributions,""7 nor does
it explain what constitutes a "developing country.' '.. Another sig-
nificant aspect of this provision is that the "equitable sharing" is
to be of "the benefits derived from" the resources and not the re-
sources themselves." This language implies that states-parties may
be required to share the acquired resources "in some final usable
stage of production"1" or the cash proceeds from the sale of such
resources.14' The provisions surrounding the future regime will be
developed in accordance with Articles 17 and 18, which provide
procedures for amendment"' and for a review of the treaty in ten
years."
Although the Moon Treaty contains provisions for the future
regulation of lunar resource exploitation, it contains no guidelines
for regulating the exploration of the lunar natural resources that
may occur before those provisions take effect. Critics of the treaty
are concerned that the absence of such guidelines implies a mora-
torium on lunar resource exploitation until an international regime
136 Id.
"' Galloway, supra note 10, at 59. The author speculates that "direct con-
tributions" would include launchings, but offers no theory as to what contributions
would be considered "indirect." Id.
138 Id. at 79. There is a problem with the definition of "developing countries"
because "if the assumption is correct that it will be many years before exploita-
tion is undertaken on the Moon ...some countries now referred to as 'develop-
ing' will have become developed." Id.
139 Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 11, para. 7.
140 Galloway, supra note 10, at 59.
141 See id.
" Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 17. Article 17 provides that any state-
party may propose amendments to the treaty that "shall enter into force for each
State Party ...accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority
of the States Parties . . . and thereafter for each remaining State Party
on the date of acceptance by it."
Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 18 states the following:
Ten years after the entry into force of the Agreement, the ques-
tion of the review of the Agreement should be included in the pro-
visional agenda of the United Nations General Assembly in order
to consider, in light of past application of the Agreement, whether
it requires revision . . .A review conference shall also consider
the question of the implementation of the provisions of article 11,
paragraph 5, on the basis of the principle referred to in paragraph
1 of that article and taking into account in particular any relevant
technological developments.
COMMENTS
is established.1" The legislative history of the agreement indicates
that such a moratorium was proposed by several of the develop-
ing countries but that the United States and the Soviet Union effec-
tively prevented it from becoming a part of the treaty. "
There also has been discussion among the critics of the Moon
Treaty whether Article 6 is a qualification of the apparent freedom
to exploit natural resources. " Article 6 specifically grants to
states-parties the right to "collect on and remove from the moon
samples of its minerals. . which. . . may be used ... for scientific
purposes.'.. States-parties may also use minerals and other sub-
stances "in quantities appropriate for the support of their mis-
sions" while conducting scientific investigations on the moon. "'
In no other place does the treaty discuss the use of lunar resources
for a particular purpose.
Article 14 provides that "[s]tates-parties to this Agreement shall
bear international responsibility for national activities on the moon
. . .and for assuring that national activities are carried out in
conformity with the provisions set forth in this Agreement.'..
Article 14 further stipulates that parties to the treaty recognize
that it may become necessary to elaborate detailed arrangements
concerning liability for damage caused on the moon.'" Under
Article 16 states-parties are also required "to take appropriate
steps"'' to ensure that the international intergovernmental organi-
zations in which they are involved will bind themselves to the
144 1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at 114-15 (statement of Leigh S. Ratiner);
Letter from Senators Frank Church and Jacob Javits to Secretary Vance (Octo-
ber 30, 1979); reprinted in OTA Study, supra note 5, at 311-12; Remarks by
Congressman John Breaux before the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (February 19, 1980).
14532 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 4, U.N. Doc. A/32/20 (1977). See
Hosenball, supra note 21, at 103.
'46 OTA Study, supra note 5, at 327; see 1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at 115
(statement of Leigh S. Ratiner). See also Miklody, Some Remarks on the Ques-
tion of the Rights of Possession of Mineral Resources of the Celestial Bodies,
PROC. 22D COLLOQUIUM ON OUTER SPACE L. 179 (1979); Vassilevskaya, Notions
of "Exploration" and "Use" of Natural Resources of Celestial Bodies, PROC. 20TH
COLLOQUIUM ON OUTER SPACE L. 473, 475 (1977).
" Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 6, para. 2.
148 Id.
"4 Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 14, para. 1.
1so Id. para. 2.
1 Id. art. 16.
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principles of the Moon Treaty when conducting activities in outer
space."'
The enforcement measures of the Moon Treaty are found in
Article 15. First, in order to "assure itself that the activities of
other States Parties ... are compatible with the provisions of this
Agreement,"" each state-party may visit any other state-party's
facilities." ' Advance reasonable notice must be given "to assure
safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the fa-
cility to be visited..'. Secondly, "a State Party which has reason
to believe that another State Party is not fulfilling the obligations
incumbent upon it pursuant to this Agreement . . may request
consultations with that State Party."' ," Finally, if the consultations
do not lead to a "mutually acceptable settlement," the parties are
to "take all measures to settle the dispute by other peaceful means
of their choice..... Each state-party has the right to request the
assistance of the Secretary General in resolving the dispute. 2
8
The final articles of the Moon Treaty stipulate that the agree-
ment will not enter into force until it has been ratified11' by five
countries.'" Any party who so desires may withdraw from the
agreement one year after its entry into force by written notifica-
tion to the Secretary General. 1 Such withdrawal will take effect
one year from the date the notification is received. '
152 Id.
151 Id. art. 15, para. 1.
154Id.
15 Id.
156 Id. para. 2.
17 Id. para. 3.
158 Id.
159 Ratification is "the adoption by one, as binding upon himself of an act
done in such relations that he may claim it as done for his benefit, although
done under such circumstances as would not bind him except for his subsequent
assent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1135 (5th ed. 1979). It should not be confused
with signing Nations desiring to become a party to a United Nations treaty
manifest their assent in a written document which they deposit with the United
Nations Secretary General. See OTA Study, supra note 5, at 349.
"I Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 19, para. 3: "This Agreement shall
enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the fifth
instrument of ratification."
161 Id. art. 20.
162 Id.
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III. IMPACT OF THE MOON TREATY ON THE SPACE ACTIVITIES
OF THE UNITED STATES
While the Moon Treaty would unquestionably have its most sub-
stantial impact on the space programs of the United States and
the Soviet Union,'" American commentators cannot agree as to
what kind of effect the Moon Treaty would have on the prospec-
tive space operations of the United States.1" Those who oppose
the Moon Treaty argue that its ratification would allow developing
countries to deny the United States access to valuable lunar re-
sources.' The proponents of the agreement maintain that ratifi-
cation of the Moon Treaty would enhance opportunities for ex-
ploration, research, and resource exploitation.'"
Several special interest groups within the United States oppose
the Moon Treaty"' on the grounds that its provisions are highly
'" The United States and the Soviet Union are the only two nations which
have the current financial and technological capabilities to profit from the moon's
numerous benefits. See Fawcett, supra note 63, at 357; see also Taubenfeld, supra
note 63, at 296.
4 Burnett, Making Sure We Get Our Share of Space, PARADE, Aug. 31, 1980,
at 16. See State Department Informal Working Paper of October 17, 1979, re-
printed in COMMITrEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION, AGREE-
MENT GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES ON THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL
BODIES 363-65 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as State Dept. Rep.];
Memorandum of the L-5 Society, reprinted in COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCI-
ENCE AND TRANSPORTATION, AGREEMENT GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES
ON THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES 366-79 (Comm. Print 1980) [here-
inafter cited as L-5 Memo].
" American Bar Association, Report, with Recommendation of the Section
of Natural Resources Law to the House of Delegates (unpublished report sub-
mitted to the House of Delegates at its 1980 meeting) [hereinafter cited as ABA
Nat. Resources L. Section Report] United Technologies advertisement. "Strangle-
hold on the Moon," Washington Post, Feb. 14, 1980 at A2, col. 2. [hereinafter
cited as United Tech. ad]: "[The treaty] would frustrate the access of our nation
and its people to space for purposes of industrialization . . .American inventive-
ness and enterprise would be shut off from the industrialization of space. The
pace and scope would be dictated by the political will of other countries." Id.;
1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at 110-14 (statement of Leigh S. Ratiner). See
Burnett, supra note 164, at 16; L-5 Memo, supra note 164, at 377.
'" Burnett, supra note 164; State Dep't. Rep., supra note 164, at 364; see
1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at 86 & 96 (statement of S. Neil Hosenball).
"'The Moon Treaty's opposition within the United States consists of the
National Association of Manufacturers, the National Ocean Industries Associa-
tion, the Law of the Sea Committee of the American Branch of the International
Law Association, the Aerospace Industries Association, the Natural Resources
Law Section of the American Bar Association, the L-5 Society, and individual
companies, including United Technologies and Kennecott Copper Corp. Several
current and former Senators and Congressmen have also become actively in-
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detrimental to a free enterprise system and would therefore have
an adverse effect on America's future in space exploration.'8 The
Moon Treaty's American adversaries have made a concerted effort
to prevent the United States from committing itself to the treaty's
principles and have offered three reasons for the United States to
withhold signature and ratification.'" They argue that the Moon
Treaty would 1) create a moratorium on the commercial exploita-
tion of extraterrestrial resources pending the establishment of an
international regime to govern such exploitation, 2) establish guid-
ing principles for the regime's formation which are inimical to
the interests of private enterprise, and 3) thereby give other coun-
tries tremendous political control in regulating or prohibiting com-
mercial exploitation.'
The first concern of the critics is that the Moon Treaty, read in
its entirety, can be interpreted to imply a moratorium on the ex-
ploitation of lunar resources prior to the establishment of an inter-
national regime to govern that exploitation.1 " More specifically,
the opposition asserts that Article 11 ( 1 ), which contains the "com-
mon heritage""m concept, read in conjunction with Article 11 (5),
which states that the future regime should be established when the
exploitation of lunar resources is about to become feasible, can be
interpreted to prohibit commercial resource exploitation until the
international regime is established."3 In addition, these opponents
point out that Article 6 specifically authorizes the use of lunar re-
sources for scientific purposes. " The right to exploit extraterrestrial
resources for commercial purposes, the critics observe, is noted
volved in opposing the Moon Treaty, including former Senators Church and
Javits and six other members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sena-
tor Goldwater, Congressman John Breaux, and others. OTA Study, supra note 5,
at 319.
1 See note 165 supra, and authorities cited therein.
161 OTA Study, supra note 5, at 318-19; see 1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at
109-17 (Statement of Leigh S. Ratiner).
170 OTA Study, supra note 5, at 318; see 1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at
109-18 (statement of Leigh S. Ratiner).
' See note 165 supra, and authorities cited therein.
"' Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 11, para. 1. See notes 119-23 supra, and
accompanying text.
171 OTA Study, supra note 5, at 337; see 1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at 107
(Statement of Leigh S. Ratiner).
"
4 OTA Study, supra note 5, at 336.
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only by its absence, making it ambiguous whether such exploita-
tion is permitted.'
Aside from the textual interpretation of the Moon Treaty, com-
mentators opposing the agreement base their conclusions concern-
ing the potential moratorium on lunar resource exploitation on
their observations of the Law of the Sea negotiations.17 The com-
mon heritage concept is a significant aspect of the draft Law of
the Sea Treaty and has been more fully developed in that context.""
Although interpretations of the phrase "common heritage" vary
from country to country,"8 there has been a general consensus
among developing countries that common heritage is synonymous
with common property or common ownership.' The parties nego-
tiating the Law of the Sea Treaty have decided accordingly that a
temporary moratorium on the exploitation of seabed minerals is
necessary to protect the vested interests of all nations.' Thus oppo-
nents of the Moon Treaty are concerned that acceptance of the
same common heritage language would force the United States to
accept a similar moratorium on the exploitation of lunar re-
sources.' Critics complain that the United States has felt compelled
1751d. at 320; see 1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at 115 (Statement of Leigh
S. Ratiner); ABA Nat. Resources L. Sec. Report, supra note 165, at 7.
179 OTA Study, supra note 5, at 320; see 1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at 102-
07 (Statement of Leigh S. Ratiner); ABA Nat. Resources L. Sec. Report, supra
note 165, at 7. The United Nations is in the process of negotiating a treaty
on the Law of the Sea which would define the rights of nations in navigating
the high seas and exploring or exploiting the soil or subsoil of the high seas.
See generally Biggs, Deep Seabed Mining and Unilateral Legislation, 8 OcEAN
DEV. & INT'L L.J. 223 (1980).
"'
7 0TA Study, supra note 5, at 320; see ABA Nat. Resources L. Sec. Re-
port, supra note 165, at 7; 1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at 102-07 (Statement
of Leigh S. Ratiner).
178 Gorove, The Concept of "Common Heritage of Mankind": A Political,
Moral or Legal Innovation, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 390, 400 (1972).
17' See id. Some states see the concept of common heritage as consisting of
three vital elements: "common wealth, common management, and common and
just share of benefits." Others refer to common heritage as "an indivisible prop-
erty with fruits that can be divided. The Soviet bloc interprets the concept
to mean "common ownership," which in view of the "different economic and
social systems" and "different forms of ownership [is] ... completely unrealistic."
Id. See notes 119-23 supra, and accompanying text.
180 OTA Study, supra note 5, at 320.
"'
8 Id. at 334. During the negotiations of the treaty, developing country repre-
sentatives demonstrated their intent to interpret "common heritage" in light of
the Law of the Sea experience. The Mexican representative stated in the U.N.
Special Political Committee: "Regarding the treaty on the moon . .. this agree-
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to make concessions with regard to deep sea mining that it does
not have to make with respect to resource exploitation in outer
space;" yet the United States allowed the Law of the Sea experi-
ence to serve as a precedent for negotiating the Moon Treaty, an at-
titude which "diminished [its] bargaining leverage"'"3 and "restricted
[its] negotiating flexibility."1' Therefore, it is highly unlikely, the
critics contend, that the developing countries would retreat from an
advantageous position to allow commercial exploitation of extrater-
restrial resources before a regulatory regime is formed."
The second reason given by opponents for the United States to
withhold ratification is that the treaty's guidelines for the future
establishment of an international regime are incompatible with
American philosophies and an inhibition on free enterprise.'"
Critics say that these guidelines are so vague that they easily could
be manipulated in a manner that would allow the Third World
countries to impose controls and limitations, extract taxes, demand
technology transfers, and obtain special rights and privileges.'87
The "equitable sharing" clause,' which provides that special con-
sideration is to be given those counties whose efforts contribute
directly or indirectly to the exploration of the moon, is of little
comfort to the treaty's critics. " A regime-controlled "equitable
ment provided that the resources of the moon were the resources of mankind,
just like the 'historic decision' on the resources of the seabed." Id. See 1979
Hearings, supra note 11, at 107-08 (Statement of Leigh S. Ratiner).
'I OTA Study, supra note 5, at 325; see 1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at
115-16 (Statement of Leigh S. Ratiner); ABA Nat. Resources L. Sec. Report,
supra note 165, at 7. Mr. Ratiner said that the United States accepted the com-
mon heritage doctrine in the context of the Law of the Sea in order to obtain
the guarantee of developing countries that there would be freedom of naviga-
tion for military vessels on the high seas. Id. at 110.
18 OTA Study, supra note 5, at 325.
1
84 Id.
'8 1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at 117 (Statement of Leigh S. Ratiner); OTA
Study, supra note 5, at 325.
18 OTA Study, supra note 5, at 319; see 1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at 100-
17 (Statement of Leigh S. Ratiner); ABA Nat. Resources L. Sec. Report,
supra note 165, at 4 & 5; United Tech. ad, supra note 165.
117 See 1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at 117; OTA Study, supra note 5, at 270,
334, 338; United Tech. ad, supra note 165.
's Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 11, para. 7.
189 OTA Study, supra note 5, at 338; Congressman John Breaux before the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (Feb. 19, 1980).
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sharing"" is, they argue, still an inhibition on free enterprise. '
The opponents realize that private investors will feel very uncom-
fortable about placing so much control over their economic futures
in the hands of powerful and uninterested third parties, and that
they will not be satisfied with the prospect of receiving only a por-
tion of the return on their investment.' "
Closely related to the second concern, the third principal reason
given by the critics for the United States to oppose the Moon Treaty
is that the establishment of a future regime would give other
countries the power to regulate and direct commercial use of the
moon as well as the power to prohibit such use." The critics claim
that the Third World, supported by the Soviet Union, is seeking to
vest control in an international regime over all natural resources
which lie beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.' The establish-
ment of this regime is regarded by some commentators as "the
first step towards a fundamental redistribution of the world's
wealth."
1
According to several of the Moon Treaty's critics, the funda-
mental issues do not place mining interests in conflict with prin-
ciples of international equity," but center on the differences that
exist in socio-economic philosophies:
[T]he fundamental issues involve differences over types of politi-
cal systems, and types of legal and juridical systems-all of which
can be argued by their advocates to be the better servants of
equity. Those who view the deep seabed debate as fundamentally
dealing with these systemic types of issues, it seems to me, tend
'
90 Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 11, para. 7.
1 1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at 108, 112 (Statement of Leigh S. Ratiner).
92 See 1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at 108 (Statement of Leigh S. Ratiner);
United Tech. ad., supra note 165.
13 1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at 106 (Statement of Leigh S. Ratiner);
OTA Study, supra note 5, at 170; Congressman John Breaux, before the Center
for Strategic and International Studies (February 19, 1980).
"IABA Nat. Resources L. Sec. Report, supra note 165, at 3. See 1979
Hearings, supra note 11, at 162 & 110 (Statement of Leigh S. Ratiner). See
generally Jain, An Approach to the New International Economic Order, 19
INDI N J. INT'L L. 544-51 (1979).
195 1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at 102 (Statement of Leigh S. Ratiner);
United Tech. ad., supra note 165.1 ABA Nat. Resources L. Section Report, supra note 165, at 5.
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not only to be correct, but also tend ... to argue their case more
effectively. 9"
The Moon Treaty's opponents make a special effort to argue their
case in accordance with this belief" and corporate America has
joined them. One corporation's advertisement opposing the Moon
Treaty concluded with the thought: "There are sound ways to help
bring the benefits of space to all people. Socializing the moon isn't
one of them."'"
The L-5 Society,'" perhaps the most adamant of the Moon
Treaty's opponents, takes great pains to rebut even the slightest
justification for ratifying the agreement."' In a memorandum re-
sponding to a State Department report favorable to the Moon
Treaty, the Society asserts that most of the potential benefits are
already contained in the other treaties dealing with outer space,
and what little the Moon Treaty does add to the existing body of
space law is not of real practical value to the United States.'" The
memorandum states: "In short . . . the marginal advances which
might be made in a few provisions are far outweighed by the
enormous sacrifice that would be required of our Nation's future
economic interests in space development."'
Several American special interest groups are strongly in favor of
the Moon Treaty.' These proponents of the Moon Treaty firmly
"I Testimony of Richard Darman, past Vice-Chairman of the United States
Law of the Sea Delegation under Ambassador Elliot Richardson and now
lecturer in Public Policy and Management at Harvard University, and Chairman
of the Committee on Law of the Sea of the American Branch of the Interna-
tional Law Association, reprinted in the ABA Nat. Resources L. Sec. Report,
supra note 165, at 5.
'See 1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at 110-17 (Statement of Leigh S.
Ratiner); United Tech. ad., supra note 165.
'United Tech ad., supra note 165.
2ooThe L-5 Society is a nonprofit organization that was formed to promote
the development of space. Its approximately 3,500 members reside in every
state of the United States and a number of foreign countries. The society was
named for Lagrange Point 5, a spot that is an equal distance from the earth
and moon and thought to be particularly suitable for a permanent space station.
Burnett, supra note 165; see OTA Report, supra note 5, at 268.
"' See L-5 Memo, supra note 164, at 366-79, a point-by-point rebuttal of a
State Department Report that enumerated the benefits of the Moon Treaty.
202 Id. at 366.
203 Id.
20'Among the proponents of the Moon Treaty are NASA, the State Depart-
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believe that the United States should sign and ratify the treaty not
only because its provisions would have a positive effect on the
United States' prospective space programs," 5 but also because it
would be detrimental to the United States to withhold signature and
ratification." Because the Moon Treaty is meeting such strong and
unexpected"' opposition in the United States,"8 its American sup-
porters are being forced into a more defensive role in advocating
their position.
The Moon Treaty's proponents recognize that the controversy
surrounding the agreement arises primarily from the provisions of
Article 11 that stipulate that the moon is the "common heritage
of all mankind" and provide for the future establishment of an
international regime "with appropriate procedures" for regulating
lunar resource exploitation.' Responding to the critics of the
Moon Treaty, the agreement's advocates maintain that Article II
does not impose a pre-regime moratorium on the exploitation
of extraterrestrial resources."' Even if the language of the treaty
itself appears to be ambiguous, the agreement's supporters demon-
strate that two factors lead to the conclusion that a moratorium was
neither intended nor established. First, the supporters note that the
right to exploit lunar resources was recognized in Article I of the
Outer Space Treaty and may have existed prior to that treaty.
Therefore, they assert that Article 11, paragraph 5 of the Moon
Treaty cannot be the conditional grant of a new right,' and it
ment, the United Methodist Law of the Sea Project, and the International Law
Section of the American Bar Association. See notes 104 & 106 supra and note
209, infra.
0
' State Dept. Rep., supra note 164, at 363-65. See OTA Study, supra note
5, at 316-18.
"I Letter from Barbara Weaver, Director of the United Methodist Law of
the Sea Project, to Warren Christopher (June 23, 1980). See notes 234-36 infra,
and accompanying text.
207 Telephone interview with Mr. Ted Wilkinson, Political Officer at the
United States Mission to the United Nations (July 8, 1980).
200 See notes 209-29 infra, and accompanying text.
"
1gMoon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 11, paras. 1 & 7. See Letter from
Barbara Weaver, Director of the United Methodist Law of the Sea Project, to
Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State (June 23, 1980); Letter from
Else M. Adjali, Executive Secretary UN/International Affairs, Women's Divi-
sion, to Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State (Dec. 14, 1979); Letter from Lee Kim-
ball to Cyrus Vance (Nov. 8, 1979).
210 ABA Int'l L. Section Report, supra note 104, at 7; see 1979 Hearings, supra
note 11, at 82 (Prepared statement of S. Neil Hosenball).
21t ABA Int'l L. Section Report, supra note 104, at 17.
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does not purport to be a limitation on an existing right.12 Secondly,
the advocates for the treaty's adoption stress that the history of the
negotiations indicates that the issue of whether the treaty should
impose a moratorium on the exploitation of lunar resources pend-
ing the establishment of a regulatory regime was thoroughly dis-
cussed."' As the advocates point out, both the United States and
the Soviet Union were opposed to the placement of a moratorium
on resource exploitation," ' and it was not until the developing coun-
tries backed down on this point that a final consensus on the
treaty as a whole was possible." The supporters further note that
during the negotiations the United States delegate specifically
addressed the moratorium question in an uncontradicted statement:
[T]he United States is not prepared to accept an express or im-
plied prohibition on the exploitation of possible natural resources
before the international conference meets and agrees on appro-
priate machinery and procedures and a treaty containing them
takes effect. In our view, the Moon agreement cannot reasonably
seek to require that exploitation must await the establishment of a
treaty-based regime.""
The Moon Treaty's proponents argue that although the treaty
does not specifically define the term "common heritage of man-
kind,''2.. it clearly states that the meaning is to be drawn from the
provisions of the treaty." This language, the advocates contend, is
an indication that definitions of the term in any other context have
no application to the term when used in the context of outer space
and the moon.,1 Therefore, the advocates state, acceptance of the
212 Id.
211 Id.; See Hosenball, supra note 21, at 103.
214 OTA Study, supra note 5 at 333. For a discussion of the history of the
negotiations of the Moon Treaty, see Galloway, supra note 10, at 27-43.
215Hosenball, supra note 21, at 100; 1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at 84
(Statement of S. Neil Hosenball). See 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 11, U.N.
Doc. A/34/20 (1979).
14Hosenball, supra note 21, at 103; 1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at 86
(Statement of S. Neil Hosenball).
217Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 11, para. 1; see 1979 Hearings, supra
note 11, at 96 (Statement of S. Neil Hosenball).
211 Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 11, para. 1. OTA Study, supra note 5,
at 333; see 1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at 95-96 (Statement of S. Neil Hosen-
ball); ABA Int'l L. Sec. Report, supra note 104, at 6.
211 OTA Study, supra note 5, at 333; ABA Int'l L. Section Report, supra note
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common heritage phrase in the Moon Treaty will not commit the
United States to accept a regime for lunar resource exploitation
with the same requirements and procedures as the regime con-
templated in the draft Law of the Sea Agreement."' Furthermore,
the common heritage term, according to these commentators, does
not connote specific implementing criteria or procedures." Such
criteria and procedures are to be developed at a later time in ac-
cordance with the provisions of Articles 11 and 18.2"
In addressing the issues surrounding the structure and powers of
the future international regime, those in favor of the Moon Treaty
argue that since the establishment of such a regime is so far in
the future, any prediction as to the legal framework it may provide
is mere speculation.' One commentator implies that by the time
our culture has the technological capabilities to exploit, lunar re-
sources commercially, the world may be so altered that the United
Nations itself is no longer necessary or employed."M Thus, the argu-
ment continues, by signing and ratifying the treaty the United
States is committing itself only to the obligation to negotiate in good
faith the criteria and procedures of the prospective regime.'
According to the treaty's proponents, the only real danger to the
United States is being excluded from those negotiations because of
its refusal to become a party to the Moon Treaty at this time.'
104, at 6; see 1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at 95-96 (Statement of S. Neil
Hosenball).
220ABA Int'l L. Section Report, supra note 104, at 5-6.
2 2 1 
Id.
"Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 11, para. 7 and art. 18.
"'Jasentuliyana, A United Nations Perspective of the Moon Agreement
(February 19, 1980) (paper presented at a seminar on the U.N. Moon Treaty
held at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown Univer-
sity), selected portions reprinted in OTA Study, supra note 5, at 323-24 [herein-
after cited as Jasentuliyana]. Nondisiri Jasentuliyana is Deputy Secretary of
COPUOS. ABA Int'l L. Sec. Report, supra note 104, at 7. See 1979 Hearings,
supra note 11, at 96-97 (Statement of S. Neil Hosenball).
24 See Matte, supra note 2, at 258-59.
212 OTA Study, supra note 5, at 335; ABA Int'l L. Section Report, supra note
104, at 7.
220 Letter from Barbara Weaver, Director of the United Methodist Law of
the Sea Project, to Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State (June 23,
1980). "Since the Moon Treaty is likely to become a reality with or without U.S.
acquiescence .. . the U.S. would be in a better position in the subsequent re-
sources regime negotiations had it signed and ratified the treaty." Id. See ABA
Int'l L. Section Report, supra note 104, at 8.
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Finally, the agreement's proponents find fault with the opposi-
tion's basic assumption that the Moon Treaty is slanted towards
a socialist point of view.2" They agree instead with the statement of
the Deputy Secretary of COPUOS:
Independent of its origins, the Agreement now represents the ex-
pression of the common collective wisdom of all Member States
of the United Nations .... [T]he few restrictions it imposes are not
relevant to the social system of states operating in outer space.
It would be unfair, therefore, to maintain that the end result of
many years of painstaking deliberations in which the United States
itself has taken a leading part provides a slant towards any one
country or any one social system."'
Furthermore, since the regime is to be developed by all the nations
who are parties to the Moon Treaty, it cannot be considered an
exclusive or monopolistic arrangement under Third World con-
trol 2'
In addition to responding to the three major arguments of the
Moon Treaty's adversaries, the advocates of the agreement offer
some arguments of their own. First, they assert that the Moon
Treaty is merely an extension of existing legal principles governing
states' activities in outer space and must be viewed in the light of
the other treaties." The proponents contend that it is a meaningful
advance in the codification of international space law."2' Without
the appropriate legal framework in which to conduct space explora-
tion, these commentators contend that the moon could easily be-
come the source of international conflict, thereby causing a highly
unstable environment for public or private investment.2 3 ' The advo-
cates also contend that because the Moon Treaty repeats some of
the principles contained in earlier treaties, it will bind parties who
have not ratified the earlier space treaties to the important princi-
227 ABA Int'l L. Sec. Report, supra note 104, at 8. "Pure ideology-whether
based on 'common heritage' principles or on free enterprise principles-has yet
to prevail in any functional international agreement." Id.
-8 Jasentuliyana, supra note 223, at 324.
22"9Id.
=0 Burnett, supra note 164, at 16.
2a3 OTA Study, supra note 5, at 314 (where a portion of a statement made by
Ambassador Richard W. Petree, U.S. Deputy Representative to the U.N. Security
Council in the U.N. General Assembly Special Political Committee has been
reprinted); ABA Int'l L. Sec. Report, supra note 104, at 11.
22 See Letter from Barbara Weaver to Warren T. Christopher (June 23, 1980).
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pies established by those agreements."n
Secondly, the agreement's proponents are concerned that the
failure of the United States to sign and ratify the Moon Treaty will
cause United States delegates to the United Nations to lose all
credibility in future negotiations.' Since the United States played
such a strong role in formulating and negotiating the treaty, some
advocates assert that it would be highly detrimental for the United
States to withhold its signature and ratification." The United States
present lack of enthusiasm for the Moon Treaty is already the cause
of great confusion within the international community.?"
IV. THE UNITED STATES' ALTERNATIVES TO RATIFICATION
From the moment that the Moon Treaty was opened for signa-
ture and ratification, the United States has had three short-term
alternatives available. It could 1) ratify the agreement, 2) issue a
statement opposing its terms, or 3) postpone a decision on the
treaty. Since the Moon Treaty met with such strong opposition
from American special interest groups, President Carter decided
to take no offcial action."7 In order to advise the President and
Senate on the issues of signature and ratification, the executive
branch of the United States government has subjected the treaty
to a review by an interagency task force. '
233 OTA Study, supra note 5, at 317.
[M]any countries which may not have ratified or acceded to the
earlier treaties, if they intend to obtain the rights and benefits of
the Moon Treaty concerning nonterrestrial resources by ratification
or adherence, must also accept the restated basic principles drawn
from the earlier treaties and included in the Moon Treaty.
Id. See Bakotic, Some Questions (Without Answers) Concerning Consent of
States to be Bound by Treaties Governing Activities in Outer Space, PROC. 22D
COLLOQUIUM ON L. OUTER SPACE 91, 92-94 for a chart of which states are bound
by each agreement.
2'4See OTA Study, supra note 5, at 318 & 346.
2 See id. at 318.
It will most certainly cost the U.S. Government some measure of
goodwill and perceived consistency, reliability, and credibility if,
after [seven] years of active participation in proposing and nego-
tiating fundamental elements of the text of this treaty, the United
States walks away from it without signing.
Id.
238 Telephone Interview with Mr. Ted Wilkinson, Political Officer of the
United States Mission to the United Nations (July 8, 1980).
23
' See OTA Study, supra note 5, at 346.2 8 Id. at 347. This interagency review may contain information of a sensi-
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Congress is currently in the process of developing an institutional
position based on a comprehensive record compiled from Congres-
sional hearings and extraneous reports from space experts.2" Since
there is some distortion in the views presented by advocates on both
sides of the issue, Congress is likely to undertake a careful review of
the actual United Nations records, especially the history of the
negotiations over the treaty. " In addition, Congress may decide to
review the final report of the interagency task force' or to organ-
ize and host a panel of series with a printed record. '
The United States government has three basic approaches that
it can take in the future.' It can 1) maintain a firm position in
opposition to the Moon Treaty," 2) request that the State Depart-
ment take the initiative in proposing that COPUOS develop an
early protocol to the Moon Treaty to clarify and define the prob-
lematic terms and ambiguities, ' or 3) develop appropriate reserva-
tions, understandings, or declarations to be incorporated into the
instrument of ratification." Along the lines of this third alternative,
the International Law Section of the American Bar Association
has proposed four declarations and understandings which could
tive, classified, or proprietary nature due to the foreign policy and long-term
industrial interests in this matter and is presently unavailable for general publi-
cation. See id.
2"Id. at 346. Only the United States Senate has the power to ratify a treaty
which would bind the United States. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2.
210 See OTA Study, supra note 5, at 347.
2141 See id. The interagency task force report, however, may be a classified
document to which Congressional leaders cannot gain access. Id.
242 Id.
20 Id. at 348.
" Id. This alternative would be accomplished by refusing to sign the Moon
Treaty or postponing any decision for an indefinite period of time. See Id.
245 Id. Although there have been no subsequent protocols associated with
previously adopted space treaties, protocols have been added for purposes of
clarifying or elaborating international treaties at the time of their negotiation or
shortly thereafter. Id. at 349.
11 Id. at 349. The provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties allow states to include reservations, understandings, or declarations
as part of the instrument of ratification. A reservation "makes a substantive
change in a treaty obligation, and most commonly takes the form of a refusal
to be bound by a particular article or provision." Id. An understanding is an
interpretation of an article or provision. A declaration is a statement of policy.
These qualifications are binding in international law between the United States
and the accepting or non-objecting parties and are binding in United States law.
Id.
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bring the Moon Treaty into closer alignment with the United States
space and foreign policies."7 These declarations provide that ex-
tracted resources will be considered the property of the extractor
and limit the obligations assumed by the United States in negotiat-
ing an international regime for resource exploitation. '" The govern-
247 ABA Int'l L. Section Report, supra note 104, at 2.
8 Id. The full text of these reservations are as follows:
(a) It is the understanding of the United States that no provi-
sion in this Agreement constrains the existing right of governmental
or authorized non-governmental entities to explore and use the
resources of the moon or other celestial body, including the right
to develop and exploit these resources for commercial or other
purposes. In addition, it is the understanding of the United States
that nothing in this Agreement in any way diminishes or alters
the right of the United States to determine how it shares the benefits
derived from exploitation by or under the authority of the United
States of natural resources of the moon or other celestial bodies;
(b) Natural resources extracted, removed or actually utilized
by or under the authority of a State Party to this Agreement are
subject to the exclusive control of, and may be considered as the
property of, the State Party or other entity responsible for their
extraction, removal or utilization;
(c) Recognition by the United States that the moon and its nat-
ural resources are the common heritage of all mankind constitutes
recognition (i) that all States have equal rights to explore and use
the moon and its natural resources, and (ii) that no State or other
entity has an exclusive right of ownership, property or appropria-
tion over the moon, over any area of the surface or subsurface of
the moon, or over its natural resources in place. In this context,
the United States notes that, in accordance with Articles XII and
XV of this Agreement, States Parties retain exclusive jurisdiction
and control over their facilities, stations and installations on the
moon, and that other States Parties are obligated to avoid inter-
ference with normal operations of such facilities.
(d) Acceptance by the United States of an obligation to under-
take in the future good faith negotiation with other States Parties
of an international regime to govern exploitation of the natural
resources of the moon in no way prejudices the existing right of the
United States to exploit or authorize the exploitation of those
natural resources. No moratorium on such exploitation is intended
or required by this Agreement. The United States recognizes that
States Parties to this Agreement are obligated to act in a manner
compatible with the provisions of Article VI(2) and the purposes
specified in Article XI(7); however, the United States reserves to
itself the right and authority to determine the standards for such
compatibility unless and until the United States becomes a party
to a future resources exploitation regime. In addition, acceptance of
the obligation to join in good faith negotiation of such a regime
in no way constitutes acceptance of any particular provisions which
may be included in such a regime; nor does it constitute an obliga-
tion to become a Party to such a regime regardless of its contents.
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ment's final decision on the Moon Treaty is not expected for several
years. '
V. CONCLUSION
While it is easy to applaud the spirit behind the Moon Treaty, it
is unwise for the United States to become unconditionally commit-
ted to principles that are not clearly defined and that cannot be
enforced. There are several problems with the Moon Treaty in its
present form. First, the Moon Treaty contains many words and
phrases that are left to the subjective interpretation of the parties.
"Common heritage" " and "equitable sharing, '..1 for example, mean
different things to different countries."' Since there is no consensus
on the definitions of these terms, it will be important for those who
want to limit the meaning of the terms to incorporate unilateral
interpretations into their instruments of ratification."
Secondly, the Moon Treaty's basic principles are somewhat
illusory. The agreement prohibits national appropriation, but leaves
states' property rights virtually intact." The commercial exploita-
tion of lunar resources is left to the supervision of a future regime,
but the regime may never be established. Parties to the Moon
Treaty are required only to "undertake"' the establishment of a
regime. ' It is quite possible that parties with such diverse socio-
economic philosophies will never be able to reach a consensus on
the issue of distributing the moon's wealth. Until the parties
reach an agreement and an international regime is established,
those nations with the financial and technological capacity to
exploit lunar resources commercially will be able to continue doing
2 9OTA Study, supra note 5, at 346. "It is clear that there is no compelling
need for the U.S. Government to act on the Moon Treaty now or in the
near future." Id. Many experts on the Moon Treaty contacted in Washington
D.C. by phone would not make any sort of statement (or prediction) as to
what action Congress and the Executive Branch would ultimately take or to the
timing of that action. Those contacted wished to retain their anonymity for
various security purposes.
2" Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 11, para. 1.
251 Id. art. 11, para. 7.
2"2 See notes 178 & 179 supra, and accompanying text.
2" See notes 246-48 supra, and accompanying text.
2" See notes 106-13 supra, and accompanying text.
2' Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. 11, para. 5.
2"See notes 129-30 & 223-25 supra, and accompanying text.
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so without any regulation whatsoever."
Finally, the Moon Treaty's enforcement measures are neither
strong nor definite enough to effectuate the treaty's purposes."8
Should the United States and Soviet Union decide to ignore the
treaty, the initial consultations provided for in the treaty would
be inadequate to resolve the ensuing dispute,"' and the other peace-
ful means of resolving conflicts could prove to be equally ineffec-
tive.' Although there are other countries that have started to
develop their space capabilities, the United States and Soviet Union
are the only nations that have both the advanced technology to
take advantage of the benefits of outer space and the military
strength to engage in the exploration and exploitation of outer
space without restraint."'
In light of the various policy considerations to be weighed, the
United States decision to postpone signature and ratification of the
Moon Treaty. is probably a good one. The American government
is aware that the failure of the United States to adopt the Moon
Treaty after proposing a substantial portion of the text and acting
as one of its principal negotiators could have a significant impact
on the credibility of the United States delegation in any future
space-related negotiations.2 Congress, however, seems to be par-
ticularly cognizant of the need to protect American interests in
extraterrestrial resource exploitation.'" The best way for the United
States government to strike a balance between these two positions
is to ratify the Moon Treaty subject to appropriate reservations
and understandings.' Thus, it is advisable for Congress to take
a closer look at the proposal of the International Law Section of
the American Bar Association.'
2
7 See notes 145 & 212-16 supra, and accompanying text.
4See notes 153-58 supra, and accompanying text.
9MId.; See note 156 supra, and accompanying text.
'"Author's opinion; see notes 157-58 supra, and accompanying text.
261 See note 163 supra, and accompanying text.
" See notes 12-13 & 237 supra, and accompanying text.
' See notes 234-36 supra, and accompanying text.
'mSee 1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at 142-71 (Statement of John Breaux);
OTA Study, supra note 5, at 265 & 319.
See note 246 supra, and accompanying text.
'"See notes 247-48 supra, and accompanying text. See also OTA Study, supra
note 5, at 348.
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